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The Impact of Democratic Party Reform on the South 
ROBERT B. DENHARDT 
University of Kansas 
and 
JAYE. HAKES 
University of New Orleans 
Following its traumatic 1968 national convention, the Democratic party 
undertook a thorough revision of its guidelines for delegate selection. The 
now-familiar McGovern-Fraser reforms sought increased involvement of all 
elements of the party in the delegate selection process by requiring timeli-
ness, openness, and non-discrimination. In 1968 many convention delegates 
had been chosen by processes beginning well before the presidential candi-
dates had even announced their intentions. To discourage this practice , the 
timeliness doctrine required that delegate selection take place entirely within 
the calendar year of the convention . The guidelines also mandated an open 
process in which all party members had an opportunity to participate . This 
policy contrasted with earlier procedures in which party officials and office-
holders dominated the entire process; for example , in Georgia and Louisiana, 
the governors hand-picked the delegates. The commitment to non-
discrimination was intended to provide representation for groups traditionally 
under-represented by requiring that blacks , women , and youth be included 
among the delegates in numbers that "bear a reasonable relationship to the 
group's presence in the population." 1 
1The new rules required that state parties : 
l. Adopt explicit written party rules governing delegate selection . 
2. Adopt procedural rules and safeguards for the delegate selection process that would : a. 
forbid proxy voting; b. forbid the use of the unit rule and related practices like instructing 
delegations; c. require a quorum of not less than 40% at all party committee meetings ; d . remove 
all mandatory assessments of delegates to the national convention; e. limit mandatory participa-
tion fees to no more than $10 and petition requirements to no more than l % of the standard used 
to measure Democratic strength ; f. ensure that in all but rural areas , party meetings are held on 
uniform dates , at uniform times , and in public places of easy access; g. ensure adequate public 
notice of all party meetings involved in the delegate selection process . 
3. Seek as broad a base of support for the party as possible in the following manner : a. add to 
the party rules and implement the six anti-racial-discrimination standards adopted by the Demo-
cratic national committee; b . overcome the effects of past discrimination by affirmative steps to 
encourage representation on the national convention delegation of minority groups , young 
people and women in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the state; c. 
allow and encourage any Democrat of 18 years of age or older to participate in all party affairs. 
4. Make, where applicable , the following changes in the delegate selection process : a. 
select alternates in the same manner as prescribed for the selection of delegates ; b. prohibit the 
ex-officio designation of delegates to the national convention ; c. conduct the entire process of 
delegate selection in a timely manner, i.e ., within the calendar year of the convention ; d . in 
convention systems, select no less than 75% of the total delegation at a leve l no higher than the 
congressional district and adopt an apportionment formula which is based on population and/or 
some standard measure of Democratic strength ; e. apportion all delegates to the national 
convention not selected at large on a basis of representation which gives equal weight to 
population and Democratic voting strength based on the previous presidential election ; f. 
designate the procedures by which slates are prepared and challenged ; g. select no more than 
10% of the delegation by the state committee . 
See Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, Mandat e for Reform 
(Washington, D. C. : Democratic National Committee , 1970). By the time of implementation, a 
few of the original guidelines were modified . 
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While the hope of the party was that these reforms would help alleviate the 
turmoil of the 1968 convention , the reforms themselves became a matter of 
serious controversy. Those who were less successful in gaining delegate votes 
in 1972 complained that the reforms hurt their campaigns , and even those who 
were successful argued that the reforms hurt their effort in the general 
election. This latter argument was reflected in a recent exchange in the 
American Political Science Review in which William Cavala claimed that " . .. 
in 1972, those rules and the dynamics of politics combined to produce a 
delegation which did not represent in either a symbolic or descriptive fashion 
the majority of those who have supported the Democratic party in the past. "2 
However , as Austin Ranney , a member of the reform commission , pointed 
out , "The prime objective ... was not to make the party more combat-ready 
for November , but rather to ensure a more repr esentativ e . . . convention. "3 
The 1972 delegate selection experience provides an excellent opportunity 
for political scientists to comment on an important area of public policy . 
However , more broadly , this experience can be helpful in increasing our 
understanding of political parties and especially the dynamics of change 
within parties. In this article , we will focus on the compliance structure of 
parties as complex organizations ; we will seek to demonstrate several ways in 
which local and state party organizations complied with the reform rules . We 
will examine the delegate selection process in the South (the area where 
compliance was supposed to be most difficult ) and, then, using the delegate 
selection process in one state , we. will analyze the state party - national party 
compliance relationship and the dynamics of politics at the local level. 
American political parties have been widely viewed as organizations in 
which compliance has been minimal. Parties have been seen as loose coali-
tions of independent parties , in part because of the limited number of sanc-
tions that the national party can apply to state and local unit. V. 0. Key said : 
"Viewed over the entire nation , the party organization constitutes no disci-
plined army. It consists rather of many state and local points of power, each 
with its own concerns with state and local nominations and elections ."4 Thus , 
state parties might be expected to resist following rules , such as the 
McGovern-Fraser reforms , established by the national party . The weakness of 
national political parties in America stems , in part , from their lack of what 
Etzioni called "utilitarian assets ", which are based on the ability to manipulate 
economic resources , including goods and services , wages , salaries , man-
2William Cavala , "Changing th e Rules Chang es the Cam e: Part y Reform and th e 1972 
California Delegation to the Democratic National Convention ," Am erican Political Science 
Review, 68 (March 1974), 42. 
3Austin Ranney, "Comment on Chan ging the Rules Changes the Came," American Political 
Science Review, 68 (March 1974), 44. 
4V. O. Key, Jr ., Politics, Parties, & Pressure Grou.ps, 5th ed. , (New York: Thoma s Crow ell 
Compan y, 1964), p . 328. See also Austin Rann ey, The Doctrin e of Responsible Party Governm ent 
(Urbana : University of Illinoi s Press, 1954), and Corn elius P. Potter and Bernard D. Hennessy, 
Politics With out Power: The National Party Committ ees (New York: Atherton Press, 1964). 
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power , and technical and administrative capabilities, etc. National parties 
have relied , instead , on "persuasive assets ," which include the manipulation 
of symbols, rituals , or other such rewards and derivations often through the 
use of mass media , and the allocation of acceptance and positive response. 5 
The adoption of McGovern-Fraser guidelines indicated a desire on the part of 
th e Democrats to promote compliance through both kinds of assets. 
REFORMING SOUTHERN SELECTION PROCESSES 
In April , 1970, the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection 
(McGovern-Fraser Commission ) filed its official report , Mandat e for Reform , 
with the Democratic National Committee . The Commission issued 18 
"guidelines " concerning the selection of delegates to the 1972 Democratic 
National Convention. Although three of the guidelines were only recommen-
dations , the Commission stated that it regarded 15 "as binding on the states ." 
The rules were to be enforced at the Convention by the Cr edentials Commit-
tee, which would refuse to seat state delegations that refused to follow the 
guidelines. The stringency of the new requir ements was indicated by the fact 
that every state was in violation of at least six of them. 
The issuance of the report raised the issue of the extent to which state 
parti es would comply with the norms of the national party . Besides the 
probl ems of any state parties adhering to national dir ectives discussed above , 
there were special reasons to expect that compliance would be difficult in the 
South. Since the New Deal , Southern Democrats have frequently been at 
odds with the leadership of the national Democratic party . Noting the failure 
of South ern Democrats to be fully integrated into the national party , Key in 
1949 remarked : " In national politics , ... the party ... is, or at least has been , 
the instrument for the conduct of the 'foreign relations ' of the South with the 
rest of the nation ."6 Although the South changed in many ways in the next two 
decades , the authors of The Changing Politics of the South characterized at 
least four of the Southern states (Alabama , Mississippi , Louisiana , and South 
Carolina ) primarily in terms of protest and resistance to national norms . 7 
Not surprisingly, there was some initial resistance to the concept of party 
5Amitai Etzioni , The ActiDe Society : A Theory of Societal and Political Processes (New York: 
The Free Press, 1968). These concept s were deve loped earlier in somewhat different terms in A 
Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1961). 
6V. 0 . Key, Jr ., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 
315. Key says in Politics, Parti es, & Pressure Group s (p . 332) that " ... the difficulti es of th e 
Democratic nation al organization with some of its southern stat e subsidiari es cannot be cope d 
with by admini strativ e sanctions . They are symptom atic of the existence in the party of an 
irreconcilable element rather than of defects of organizational arrangements." 
7William C. Havard , ed ., Th e Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1972). For an overview of the role of the South in the Democ ratic party , see 
Donald S. Stron g, "Fu rth er Reflections on Southern Politi cs," Journal of Politics, 33 (May 1971), 
239-56, and Allen P. Sindler , ed ., Change in the ContemporanJ South (Durham , N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1963). 
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reforms from the South . The four major credentials fights at the 1968 Demo -
cratic convention concerned Southern states (Mississippi , Texas , Georgia , 
and Alabama ), and there was some feeling that Southern states might be the 
"target" of written standards for delegate selection . While the 1968 conven-
tion wa~ mandating party reform by a 1,350-1,206 approval of the minority 
report of the Rules Committee, del egates from Southern states were opposing 
the proposal by a margin of more than four to one . To some extent , the new 
guidelines did affect delegation selection more in Southern states than 
elsewhere. As seen in Table 1, the 1968 plans of Southern stat es had somewhat 
more violations of the new requirements than those of other states, although 
the need for change was extensive everywhere. 
To effect the mandated reforms , state parties followed the common pattern 
of (1) establishing study commissions to suggest particular plans in compliance 
with the guidelines , (2) adopting such plans , and (3) if necessary , asking state 
legislatures to make appropriate changes in state laws. These steps produced 
extensive changes in the rules for delegate selection in Southern states . 
Whereas no Southern states used presidential preference primaries in 1968, 
Florida , North Carolina , and Tennesse e did so in 1972. Louisiana and Georgia 
used committees dominated by Democratic governors to pick delegates in 
1968, but no state attempted to use such closed procedures in 1972. Although 
th e predominate method of selecting delegates in the South remained , as it 
was in 1968, the convention system, all eleven states made extensive efforts to 
conform with the guidelines . According to the reform commission itself , 
Alabama and North Carolina achieved full compliance in 1970; Mississippi , 
Tennessee, and Virginia met the requirements in 1971; and Arkansas , 
Louisiana , South Carolina , and Texas did so in 1972. At the opening of the 
1972 national convention , Florida and Georgia were judged to be in "substan-
tial compliance," meaning they had made most of the required changes, but 
were still deficient in one area. Thus , by 1972 the written plans of the 
Southern state parties had , with only minor exceptions, come into compliance 
with the national requirements and had done so at a rate quite similar to those 
of other states. (See Table 2.) 
Political scientists do not need to be reminded that there may be important 
differences between written plans for delegate selection and formal com-
pliance on the one hand and the actual process of selecting delegates and 
operational compliance on the other. Judgments on the process of selecting 
delegates were rendered by the Credentials Committee and ultimately the 
convention as a whole. Although political strategems played a part in the 
deliberations of the Credentials Committee , its manifest function was to 
determine whether delegates had been elected according to the rules of the 
national party and whether the various delegations were representative. 
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Many of its deci sions were based on field reports from its staff of 34 hearing 
officers . 8 
The Credentials Committe heard challenges to all of the Southern delega-
tions , except that from Arkansas . Challenges in the South accounted for 10 of 
the 26 disputed states considered by the committee. The large number of 
Southern challenges is difficult to explain, however , since the bulk of them 
were denied by the committee. Only in Georgia were extensive adjustments 
in the delegation required. In Louisiana and Virginia , changes involving only 
a few votes were made . The delegations of the eight other Southern states 
wer e accepted in toto. The convention delegates upheld all of the judgments 
of the Credentials Committee , except they reversed its unseating of 151 
California delegates pledged to George McGovern . 
The results of action by the Credentials Committee and on the floor of the 
convention are tabulated in Tabl e 3. As can be seen , a high percentage of 
delegations and delegates were accepted by the Credentials Committee and 
the convention , indicating a high rate of compliance with national guidelines 
by state parties in the process of delegate selection. In addition , the rate of 
acceptance of Southern delegations and delegates was similar to that for the 
rest of the nation , indicating that there was no special resistance to national 
norms in Southern state parties . 
While the reforms were directed toward changing procedures , they were 
also substantively concerned with the representation of previously under-
represented groups (demographic representation ) and the responsiveness of 
the resulting delegations to the wishes of the Democratic electorate (preferen-
tial representation ). The first of these concerns is particularly appropriate to 
study in the context of Southern politics , since the failure of earlier Southern 
delegations to include significant representation of blacks was in large mea-
sure responsible for the consideration of this issue by the reform commission. 
The second issue - the responsiveness of the resulting delegation - is of 
special interest in the South since it was her e that the resulting delegations 
seemed to deviate most markedly from the anticipated political preferences of 
the voters . 
Demographi c Repres entation 
The changes in the rules governing delegate selection which required that 
blacks , women , and young people be represented among the delegates in 
proportions that "bear a reasonable relationship to the group 's presence in the 
population " were largely brought about in response to the previous transgres-
sions of Southern states. For years, black voters in the South - a group 
probably providing the majority of those supporting Democratic presidential 
candidates - were systematicaJly denied access to the delegate selection 
8Of the People: Report of the Credentials Committee to the 1972 Democratic Nat ional 
Convention {Washington , D.C .: Democ ratic National Committee , 1972). 
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process and, as a result, were not represented on the delegations finally 
chosen . Where the formation of delegate slates or the direct selection of 
delegates rested solely with white (often blatantly racist) politicians, there was 
little hope or expectation that there would be black delegates to the national 
convention . 
At the 1964 convention, the Democratic party endorsed a strong platform 
position in support of civil rights legislation; however, at that same conven-
tion , there were a total of only four black delegates from all the Southern states 
combined. Some progress was made between 1964 and 1968, and all the 
Southern states had black delegates in 1968. Only one state, however , had as 
many as ten blacks on its delegation. None had a percentage ofblack represen-
tation which would approximate the percentage of the state's voters who were 
black. However limited this progress, it is important to note that stronger 
black representation was obtained in 1968 without the imposition of quotas. 
The strength of the civil rights movement and the diffusion of this national 
norm through the South was enough to bring about some changes. 
The 1972 delegations from the South did have significant black representa-
tion (see Table 4). All the Southern states but one (Texas) had delegations with 
black representation exceeding the percentage of black voters in the state. 
Although the dominant concern in the South was with racial balance, women 
and young people also increased their representation in 1972. Female rep-
resentation in Southern delegations went from 13% in 1968 to 36% in 1972 
(see Table 5), while the number of young delegates also jumped substantially. 
The obvious question is whether the increases in the delegate strength of 
blacks, women, and young people were caused by the implementation of the 
new rules on delegate selection, specifically quotas, or whether they were the 
result of changing political norms of a more diffuse sort. 
Preferential Representation 
The increase in the number of blacks on the Southern delegations to the 
1972 convention -as striking as it was -was equalled in terms of surprise by 
the liberal leaning of many Southern delegations. While support for the 
candidacy of George Wallace was obviously high in the South in 1972, George 
McGovern received a substantial number of delegate votes from the South. 
Specifically , at the convention, of those delegates from the South voting for 
either Wallace or McGovern, McGovern received well over a third of the 
votes. In fact, in three states, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, McGovern 
received more delegate votes than Wallace. This occured in spite of the fact 
that many black delegates from the South, who might have been expected to 
add to the McGovern vote, supported the candidacy of Shirly Chisholm. 
The question of whether Southern delegations were reflective of the 
political preferences of Southern Democrats rests on one's definition of 
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"Democrats. " In the South , it is helpful to distinguish between "local Demo-
crats" and "national Democgats. " Local Democrat s constitute the great bulk 
of the population , as can be seen in reg istration figures and election results for 
state and local offices. Party identification surveys and results in national 
elections indicate that national Democrats have decrease d in numb er in 
recent decades , include only a minority of South ern voters, and are larg ely 
black. 9 
In primary states, where large numbers of voters participat ed, th e results 
of delegate selection reflect ed th e pr efe renc es of local as well as national 
Democrats. In the three South ern states holding pr esidential pr efe rence 
primaries in 1972, George Wallace rece ived 73% of the delegates, while 
George McGovern received only 5%. In convention states , however , local 
Democrats were not motivated to participat e, leav ing decision-making to th e 
national Democrats . The national Democrats in the South were thos e in-
tens ely interested in the outcom e of delegat e selection and most acquainted 
with the fact that the rules had changed. In the convention states, McGovern 
received 32% of the delegates , compared to Wallac e's 25%. Although organi-
zational inputs affected greatly these variations in candidate strengths , the 
differenc es betw ee n the re sults of primary and non -primary stat es see m to 
indicat e that changing the rul es changed the players. From whatever system 
they were selected in 1972, the delega tes were reflective of the pr efe rences of 
those who identified with and participated in those particul ar systems. In 
some cases, they represented local Democrats ; in other cases, national Demo-
crats. 
On the whole , th ere was a high level of compliance by Southern state 
parties in 1972 with the guidelines of the McGov ern-Fraser Commission. 
Such compliance is indicated by the adoption of new rul es for del ega te 
selection and the representative character of the delegations , particularl y as 
measured by demographic variables. Gvien the tradition al view of the rul e-
making power of national parti es and of Southern politics , thi s finding is 
significant. This macroscopic view , howeve r, does not help us to discern very 
well the reasons for compliance or the political dynamics of delega te selection . 
THE CASE OF LOUISIANA 10 
Very littl e detailed information exist s on delega te selection in th e South -
ern states. This gap in the literatur e of political science is part icu larly acute for 
9 Havard (ed. ), Changing Politics of the South , p. 728; and Everett Ladd , Jr ., Charles 
Hadley, and Lauriston King, "A New Political Realignm ent ?" Public Interest, No. 23 (Spring 
1971). 57-58. 
1
°1'he study of Louisiana is based in part on the participant-observer method . Both aut hors 
worked in the McGovern campaig n in Louisiana : one was a McGovern delegate to the national 
conve ntion . Both during and after the process of delegate selection, the authors had numerous 
occasions to discuss the events at lengt h with part icipants from various camps. To .test our 
observations, a questionnaire was mailed to the 40 delegates elec ted at congress ional district 
conventions. Since the questionnaires were not sent until 1974, the response of 11 was not 
surpri sing. Although the delegates returning questionnaires were a good cross sectio n in terms of 
geogra ph y and presidential preference , their percepti ons of the selec tion process did not vary 
grea tly among themse lves, now did they differ grea tly from those of the authors. 
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the convention states, for convention states in the South, as those elsewhere, 
have been virtually ignored by journalists, practitioners writing memoirs, and 
political scientists. 11 For this reason, case studies in particular states are 
necessary for analysis of the impact of national party rules. 
Adopting the Rules 
Louisiana was one of the states where resistance to national party 
guidelines might have been expected to occur. The state's previous methods 
of selecting delegates to national conventions were in direct violation of some 
of the reform commission's most important requirements. 12 Delegates had 
previously been picked by the Govegnor rather than chosen in any kind of 
open process, and blacks, who comprised approximately 30% of Louisiana's 
population, were grossly underrepresented in previous delegations. 13 
Moreover, an acceptable plan had to be produced by a Democratic State 
Central Committee that had long been reluctant to cooperate with the na-
tional party. In 1948 the Democratic Committee almost kept the name of 
Harry Truman off the ballot in Louisiana. Although politics in Louisiana 
changed greatly in the next two decades, the actions of the State Central 
Committee in 1968 ousting the loyalist national committeeman and denying 
the Democratic presidential candidate the rooster, traditional emblem of the 
party in Louisiana, suggested that the committee was still in a state of 
semi-rebellion against the national party. 14 Moreover, the membership of the 
Democratic committe had been .elected in 1971 from districts that favored 
small rural parishes, that included a number of multi-member districts and 
that had been declared unconstitutional for 1971 legislative elections. 15 Only 
three of the committee's 117 members were black. 
The Democratic Committee did not rush to adopt a plan satisfying national 
party requirements; the 13-person study committee, which included one 
black and one woman, that was supposed to develop Louisiana's plan was not 
selected until December of 1971. The study committee adopted a "two-
tiered" plan of delegate selection. The process of selection was to begin with 
party caucuses open to all registered Democrats in the state's 105 legislative 
representative districts. These 105 caucuses elected delegates (15 from each 
caucus) to eight congressional district conventions, which in turn selected 40 
of the 44 delegates to the national convention. Four delegates were elected at 
11 Robert B. Denhardt and Jay E. Hakes , "Delegate Selection in on-Primary States ," 
National Civic Review , 63 (November 1974), 521. 
12 For a description of delegate selection in 1968, see Ted Martin , "The Democratic Party of 
Louisiana and the Selection of Delegates to the 1968 National Convention ", (Mimeo prepared by 
the New Orleans Coalition, 1969). 
13 o blacks were included in Louisiana 's 1964 delegation. In 1968 the delegation contained 9 
blacks (out of a total of 52) with 5½ votes (out of 36). 
14 Perry H. Howard , "Louisiana: Resistance and Change ," in Havard (ed. ), Changing Politics 
of the South , pp. 574-82. 
15 Stanley A. Halpin , Jr ., and Richard L. Engstrom , "Racial Gerrymandering and Southern 
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large. 16 After the study committee made several adjustments in its plan 
requested by the national Democratic headquarters, the full State Committee 
on February 19 approved the two-tier plan, bringing Louisiana into full 
compliance with the requirements established by the Reform Commission. 
The State Committee chose to work within the guidelines of the national 
party, since to do otherwise could well have meant that the Louisiana delega-
tion would not be seated at Miami. 
The Democratic State Central Committee later printed and distributed in 
official plan for delegate selection and selected chairmen and sites for the 
representative and congressional district caucuses to be held on April 15 and 
May 13. 
The Issue of Representation 
The adoption of new party rules, while meeting the formal requirements of 
the Reform Commission, in no way guaranteed that a "representative" delega-
tion would be selected, nor did it answer the question of what a representative 
delegation should look like. The official plan pointed out that blacks in 
Louisiana comprised about 30% of the population, females at least 50%, and 
young people between the ages of 18 and 30 about 20% and recommended 
that "every effort be made to select delegates truly representative of all 
Democrats of Louisiana in the respective caucuses and congressional district 
conventions including youth , women, blacks and other ethnic minorities. 17 
But blacks were skeptical that the new system would produce sizeable in-
creases in representation for them. To comply with national requirements, 
the selection plan banned winner-take-all provisions at the state level, but not 
at the representative district or congressional districts levels. Since blacks did 
not approach a majority in any congressional district and since previous 
Louisiana elections demonstrated a reluctance on the part of whites to vote for 
black candidates, it was not unreasonable to expect that the Louisiana delega-
tion would continue to include few, if any, blacks. An ad hoc, but effective 
state-wide organization of blacks known informally as "the black challenge," 
planned initially to run an alternative system of delegate selection and present 
its case for seating at the Miami Convention to the credentials committee. 18 
State Legislative Redistricting ," Journal of Public Law , 22, No. 1 {1973), 52-57. 
16The new rules also reguired , inter alia, that (1) the caucuses and conventions be widely 
publicized , (2) the call should stress that the invitation extended to "all Democratic voters of any 
color , creed , sex, and age , young and old ," (3) those who wished to run as candidates in the 
caucuses or conventions had to submit written notification along with 6ve dollars to the respective 
chairman at least five days prior to the meetings , ( 4) candidates at local caucuses would be allowed 
to speak in their own behalf , (5) voting would be by secret ballot, and (6) a majority of votes cast 
was necessary for election at all levels. See Democratic State Central Committee of Louisiana , 
"Official Plan for Delegate Selection to the 1972 Democratic National Convention." 
17 lbid. , p . 6. 
18The "black challenge " was organized by a black New Orleans attorney, who maintained 
communications with the Center for Democratic Reform in Washington , D .C., as well as with 
black political leaders throughout Louisiana . 
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The group participated in what it considered a defective plan (i.e. the plan 
adopted by the State Central Committee), in part because it viewed this step 
as a necessary prerequisite for a successful challenge. 
The question of black representation continued to be an important issue 
throughout the delegate selection process. Few people connected with the 
selection process denied that blacks should receive some representation. The 
Reform Commission's guidelines seemed to require that blacks constitute 
about 30% of the state's delegation, since that was their portion of the state's 
population. Members of the "black challenge" argued that blacks were enti-
tled to 50% of the delegation because of their heavy support of previous 
Democratic candidates for president. 19 Many people in the McGovern or-
ganization accepted the black challenge' s view of racial balance, but many 
others in the state viewed the demand as unreasonable. 
Although racial balance was the dominant issue concerning representa-
tion, other aspects of the problem were not ignored. The Women's Political 
Caucus publicly demanded equal representation for women and organized 
orientation sessions for potential female participants in several areas of the 
state. Young people did not organize as a group, although many were active in 
the process and argued as individuals that they should be included in the 
delegation because of their age. 
Participation 
Exact figures on participation in Louisiana's first step in delegate selection, 
the 105 representative district caucuses, were not kept. Attendance at the 
local meetings varied from about 20 to 1000 people. Although the meetings 
were open to all registered Democrats, less than one percent of those eligible 
attended their caucus. Each district was to elect 15 delegates to the congres-
sional district caucuses, but in some areas less than 15 people filed the 
necessary papers to run, although doing so was quite easy. One reason for low 
attendance was undoubtedly the low visibility of the new system. The cau-
cuses did receive some publicity, but nothing like the political advertising that 
might go into a local campaign for a judgeship. In addition, the system was 
new and unfamiliar to voters. Another reason for low attendance may have 
been the length of the meetings, as compared with the time needed to simply 
cast a vote. At least one stormy caucus lasted 10 hours. 20 
19The delegate strength of individual states at the national convention was determined by 
population and by Democratic vote in the previous presidential election. Since blacks had cast 
over 70% of the votes in Louisiana for Hubert Humphrey in 1968, the demand by blacks for 50% 
representation was an approximation of the average of these two factors. 
2
°1'wo factors contributed to the length of the caucuses. First , candidates were allowed to 
give speeches. With the number of candidates ranging as high as 43, this part of the meetings 
consumed considerable time. Second, where many candidates were running , run off ballots were 
usually necessary . Since efficient methods of counting the first ballot results had generally not 
been developed , this process t?o often took more time than had been contemplated. 
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A key factor in th operation of caucus politics was that few of the people 
who attended the local m etings did so without some organized encourage-
ment. Groups urging their supporter to attend caucuses included th black 
challenge , supporters of George Wallace , supporters of Georg McGovern , 
the women 's political caucus , and a number of elected officials and their 
followers favoring delegates uncommitt d to any presidential candidate. 
one ofthes groups wer monolithic, nor were they mutually exclusive. Yet 
the activities and int ractions of the e groups provided the major inputs into 
the dynamics of delegate selection. Winners at th caucus level were accused 
of "packing" them , but attendance would have been even lower if organized 
groups had not worked on turnout. 
The success of the above groups in getting supporters to the caucuses was 
largely dependent on their investment of time and energy in organization . A 
coalition of elected officials favoring an uncommitted delegation had been 
expect d to dominate the selection process at all levels , with th stronge t 
opposition coming from supporters of George Wallace , who carried the stat 
in 1968. However , turnouts at caucuses produced results in which elected 
officials won only a part of the d I gation , and the Wallace people made a 
strong showing in only one of the state 's eight congressional districts. With the 
Democrats having only a slim chance of winning the presidency , the b nefits 
for el cted officials of working on national politics did not seem high. 
Moreover, the enthusiasm of el cted officials for the new sel ction process 
was, at the most, limited, since one of its purposes was to open up the system 
to other groups. The Wallacites seemed handicapped by their lack of know-
ledge about and attention to delegate sel ction in non-primary states. 21 By 
contrast , McGovernites , the black chall nge, and the women's caucus ex-
pected to hen fit from the n w rules, invested a great deal of effort in turning 
out voters, and achieved greater success in th caucuses than expected by the 
news media or by elected officials. 
All delegates to the Miami convention returning questionnaires attributed 
the success of various groups to their efforts to promote participation at the 
initial caucuses. Their interpretations of the events differed according to 
succ ss of their group. A black female McGovern delegate elected from 
Louisiana's Second Congressional District attributed the patterns in partici-
pation to "real grass roots campaigns [ that ] got the voters out ." A white male 
Wallace delegate elected from the Sixth Congressional District attributed the 
turnout to the fact that the "left wing and blacks ... were schooled and drilled 
21 Billy Joe Camp , Wallace s national pr ess secretary , has ince said :" [ think the reason that 
Wallace did not go more heavily into the non -primary stat es was because of a lack of knowledge 
about the reform rules of the party on the part of the people dir ecting the campaign. There was a 
feeling that if we got good votes out of the primaries , some oft he non -primary stat es would full into 
line ." Ernest May and Janet Fraser (eds .), Campaign '72: The Ma,wg ers Speak (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press , 1973), p. 100. 
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in tactics to disgust others with the whole situation. It was a conspiracy from 
the beginning." 
Although participants in the 1972 systems varied in their enthusiasm for 
the new reforms, the vast majority had been supporters of Hubert Humphrey 
in the 1968 general elections. Noticeable by their relative absence in the 
selection process were the many Democrats that voted for ixon and Wallac e 
in 1968. 
Bargainin g and Negotiation 
The caucus-convention system used in Louisiana proved to be a stimulus 
to bargaining and negotiation . The exchange process began at the local cau-
cuses on April 15. Slates of 15 candidates who pooled their support had a great 
advantage in the caucuses over candidates who ran as individuals; it was 
unlikely that one individual could bring as many supporters to his or her 
caucus as could a coalition of 15 people. Many candidates ran as individuals, 
but when full slates were formed - some in advance of the meetings , others 
on the spot - they were usually successful. Many of the winning slates were 
balanced according to age, sex, and, in mixed areas, race . Balanced slates were 
achieved in part because some participants feared a challenge before the 
Credentials Committee if blacks , women, and young people were not in-
cluded, in part because blacks were threatening to boycott the process if not 
given adequate representation , in part because many of the participants were 
committed ideologically to the idea of balance , and in part because slates 
including diverse groups were able to attract broad support. 
Supporters of George Wallace were unable to coalesce with other groups. 
Their lack of sympathy with racial balance and their image with other groups 
handicapped efforts at joint slates. In areas where Wallace support was strong, 
it frequently served to encourage cooperation between McGovern and non-
McGovern national Democrats , groups that often had trouble cooperating in 
the absence of the "Wallace threat." 
A similar pattern evolved in the congressional district conventions of May 
13 and the election state-wide of the at-large delegates on May 20. It was 
advantageous for candidates to run on slates, and groups other than the 
Wallace supporters were hesitant to support slates that were racially and 
sexually unbalanced for reasons both pragmatic and ideological. 
The Louisiana delegation, which in the end was 43% black , 34% female, 
and 27% under 30, was produced in large part by negotiated slatemaking. 
one of the identinable groups - blacks , women , McGovernites, Wallacites, 
and uncommitted candidates usually organized by elected officials - had 
enough strength to elect delegates by themselves. Hence , their success in the 
selection process depended to some extent on their ability to negotiate and 
compromise. Women were very successful at early stages of the process but 
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could not translate their early strength into a large number of delegates. 
Women could not retain a unified bargaining front, because they were divided 
by other loyalties as blacks, McGovernites , and by ties to elected officials. By 
contrast, blacks became increasingly successful as the selection process prog-
ressed, because they retained cohesiveness in negotiations. McGovern sup-
porters found it relatively easy to enter into coalitions, because they had been 
committed from the start to substantial representation for blacks and women. 
Elected officials were handicapped by a large number of previous com-
mitments for delegate slots that inhibited compromise with other groups. At 
several points in the selection process local McGovern leaders and represen-
tatives of elected officials attempted to put together compromise slates. 
Despite the use of intermediaries in Washington, D.C., these negotiations 
always broke down. As a result, the forces of McGovern and elected officials 
often competed with each other for the support of black and female delegates. 
Elected officials were not as successful in forming coalitions with blacks as they 
might have been had they devoted more attention to delegate selection. The 
night before the selection of at-large delegates in Baton Rouge, the Governor 
failed to attend a scheduled appointment with the black delegates already 
chosen. This lack of effort by the Governor ended any chances for a coalition 
between the Governor and black delegates. In the end the Governor himself 
was selected as a delegate, but the rest of his slate for the at-large positions, 
consisting of the Democratic national committeeman, the state president of 
the AFL-CIO, and the chairman of the Democratic state central committee, 
was defeated by three black candidates supported by black and McGovern 
delegates. 22 
The Louisiana experience demonstrates that the balance in its delegation 
was not simply the result of the new party rules , or what Etzioni refers to as 
"utilitarian compliance. "23 The reformed selection system established a con-
text in which balanced representation could be achieved. Representation was 
achieved in part because many of the participants in the process were national 
Democrats in sympathy with the requirements of the reform commission. In 
addition, the symbolism associated with the new rules was particularly attrac-
tive to blacks, women, and non-professional politicians. Since these groups 
turned out in relatively heavy numbers for local caucuses , compliance with 
22The situation in Georgia contrasted sharply with that in Louisiana . The distribution of 
McGovemites , blacks , and those tied to elected officials in the delegation after congressional 
district conventions there was roughly the same as in Louisiana . But in Georgia , after the 
Governor expended considerable effort meeting with black delegates , a working coalition was 
formed between blacks and elected officials rather than between blacks and McGovernit es. 
23 If representation was achieved simply because of the new rules , women would have been 
as successful as blacks in winning seats , since the rules applying to the two groups were similar . 
Yet blacks comprised 43% of the delegatfon and women 34%. In addition , if utilitarian complian ce 
fully explained the changes in representation , levels of representation would have been uniform 
throughout the state . Yet the three congressional districts including parts of metropolitan New 
Orleans produced delegations that were 53% female and 47% black, while the delegations from 
the other five districts were 35% black and 22% fema.le. 
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national norms of representation occurred because most participants wanted 
it to occur. Thus, representation was achieved by normative as well as utilita-
rian compliance, as well as by the dynamics of political bargaining and negotia-
tion . 
CONCLUSION 
Southern states clearly did comply with the requirements of the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission in 1972 delegate selection. This adherence to 
national party norms occurred despite the severity of the rules, the common 
notion that national parties cannot control state parties , and the historic 
position of the South as a dissenting region with the national Democratic 
party. 
The reasons for compliance are difficult to pinpoint. To some extent, 
compliance was utilitarian, in that it resulted from the threat of sanctions . The 
ultimate sanction was that delegations chosen in a manner considered im-
proper would not be seated at the national convention. Even Democrats 
disenchanted with the national party desired seating at the convention, so 
they were obliged to adhere to the new guidelines. 
In the caucus-convention state of Louisiana (and probably in a number of 
other non-primary states ) participation in the delegate selection process was 
dominated by national Democrats , supporters of George McGovern , and 
blacks , all of whom sympathized to varying degrees with the new national 
rules . As a result , compliance by those who participated was largely voluntary , 
and in some cases, such as the representation of blacks , the local state 
delegations surpassed the minimal requirements of the national rules. 
For some time , there have been two complementary trends in the de-
velopment of the Democratic party in the South - its decreasing share of the 
electorate in national elections and its "nationalization. "24 The national norms 
of the party have , to a large extent , been responsible for a drop in the loyalty of 
many Southerners to the party. The decreasing size , however , has meant in 
turn that the remaining core of Democrats are increasingly likely to sym-
pathize with national norms . The delegate selection process in the South in 
1972 probably exaggerated these trends , because of the importance of motiva-
tion for participation in non-primary systems. Yet the 1972 results were 
consistent with these long-range trends. 
24 Robert J. Steam e r, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party ," in 
Sindler (ed .), Change in the Contemporary South , p. 150; Havard , Changing Politics of th e 
South . 
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TABLE l. Changes Required by Guidelines of Reform Commission 
Violations in 1968 Plans 
Stat es 0-3 
0% 
0% 
4-7 8-11 12-15 
9% 
8% 
South ern 
Oth er 
27% 
40% 
64% 
53% 
Source : Calculated from Commission on Party Stru ctur e and Delegate Selection , The Party 
Ref onn ed (Washington , D .C.: Democratic National Committ ee, 1972). 
TABLE 2. Rates of Compliance with Reform Commission Guidelines 
Stat es 
South ern 
Oth er 
1970 
18% 
5% 
1971 
27% 
45% 
Source: Calculated from The Party Ref onn ed. 
1972 
36% 
30% 
not in full 
complian ce 
18% 
20% 
TABLE 3. Compliance and Southern Delegations to the 1972 Democratic National Convention 
Stat es 
Southern 
Oth er 
Crede ntials Committ ee 
Unchallenged Delegations ac-
Delegations cepted in toto 
9% 73% 
58% 75% 
Delegates 
Accept ed 
98% 
89% 
On Floo r 
Delegations Delegates 
Accepted Accepted 
73% 98% 
78% 95% 
Source: Calculated from Report of the Credentials Committ ee to the 1972 Democratic National 
Convention; and Richard C. Bain and Judith H. Parri s, Convention Decisions and Voting 
Records, 2nd ed . (Washington, D .C.: The Brookings In stitution , 1973). 
TABLE 4. Black Presence in Southern Delegations 
1964 1968 1972 
Stat es Total No. % Total No. % Total No. o/o 
Alabama 37 0 0 50 2 4 37 10 27 
Arkansas 53 0 0 54 1 1.85 27 5 18.5 
Florida 59 0 0 63 4 6.35 81 11 13.5 
Georgia 59 4 6.7 64 17 26.5 53 18 33.9 
Louisiana 50 0 0 52 9 17.3 46 19 41.3 
Mississippi 44 0 0 45 9 20 25 14 56 
orth Carolina 74 0 0 74 4 5.4 64 13 20.3 
South Carolina 42 0 0 42 6 14.2 32 11 34.3 
Tennessee 66 0 0 66 7 10.6 49 16 32.6 
Texas 121 0 0 120 6 5 130 12 9.2 
Virginia 66 0 0 64 6 9 .3 56 16 28.5 
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TABLE 5. Presence of Women in Southern Delegations 
1964 1968 1972 
Stat es Total No. % Total No. % Total No. % 
Alabama 37 2 5.4 50 2 4.0 37 7 18.9 
Arkansas 53 9 16.9 54 12 22.2 27 12 44.4 
Florida 59 26 44.07 63 30 47.6 81 34 41.9 
Georgia 59 7 11.8 64 4 6.2 53 16 30 .l 
Louisiana 50 11 22 52 4 7.69 46 15 32 .6 
Mississippi 44 2 4.5 45 4 8.8 25 11 44.0 
North Carolina 74 11 14.8 74 6 8.1 64 30 46 .8 
South Carolina 42 l 2.38 72 3 7.1 32 8 25.0 
Tennessee 66 7 10.6 66 6 9.09 49 24 48.9 
Texas 121 8 6.6 120 13 10.8 130 39 30 
Virginia 66 7 10.6 64 6 9.38 56 21 37 .5 
